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We address the question, in decision theory, of how the value of risky options (gambles) should 
be assessed when they have no finite standard expected value (i.e. where the sum of the 
probability-weighted payoffs is infinite or not well defined). We endorse, combine, and extend 
(1) the proposal of Easwaran (2008) to evaluate options on the basis of their weak expected 
value, and (2) the proposal of Colyvan (2008) to rank options on the basis of their relative 
expected value.  
 Our goal is to outline a framework rather than to give a compelling defense of it. We 
shall motivate, through the use of examples, the plausibility of principles that go beyond standard 
expected value. Although the principles we endorse leave some options incomparable, we 
believe that they are, at least roughly speaking, the strongest plausible extensions of standard 
decision theory. 
 
1. The Problem 
We address the question in decision-theory of how (risky) options should be evaluated when they 
have no finite standard expected value. In this section, we shall define these terms and explain 
the problem.  
Throughout, we restrict our attention to cases where an option determines a countable set 
{<p1,v1>, <p2,v2>, …, <pk,vk>,…}, where pk is the probability of receiving a payoff of vk. We 
thus do not address cases where there are uncountably-many distinct finite payoffs with non-zero 
probability. We further assume that the values of outcomes are independently specified (e.g., 
monetary values or wellbeing values) on an interval scale. Thus, we assume that there is a fact 
about whether the difference in value between two outcomes is less, equal, or greater than the 
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difference in value between two other outcomes. We leave open what kind of value (e.g., 
prudential vs. moral) is used, since that may vary based on the nature of the decision problem.  
We further assume that the evaluation of options is risk neutral. Thus, we assume that, in 
the standard cases, risky options are evaluated on the basis of their standard expected value, that 
is, on the basis of the probability-weighted sum p1v1 + p2v2 + … + pnvn + … The problem, as we 
shall explain, is that sometimes this sum is not well defined. The usual assumption is that such 
options cannot be evaluated. We shall endorse principles proposed by Easwaran (2008) and 
Colyvan (2008) and then combine and extend those principles. 
The sum of a set of numbers is well-defined just in case the order of summation does not 
matter, that is, just in case each order of summation results in the same total. A crucial 
mathematical fact is that the sum of a (countable) set of numbers is well defined if and only if 
either the sum of the positive terms is finite (or there are no such terms) or the sum of the 
negative terms is finite (or there are no such terms). If both sums are finite, the sum of the entire 
set is simply the sum of these two finite numbers. If one sum is finite, and the other sum is 
(positively or negatively) infinite, the sum of the entire set is well defined and correspondingly 
infinite. If both sums are infinite, then there is no well-defined sum. For such sets the order of 
summation matters. 
For example, for the set {… –1/32, –1/8, –1/2, 1, 1/4, 1/16, …}, the sum of the positive 
numbers (1+1/4+1/16+… ) is 4/3 and the sum of the negative numbers (–1/2–1/8–1/32–…) is –
2/3. This establishes that the above set of values has a well-defined sum equal to 2/3 (=4/3–2/3). 
For the set {–1/2, 1, 1/3, 1/5, …, 1/(2n+1), …}, the sum of the negatives is finite (–1/2) and the 
sum of the positives is infinite. Hence, this set has a well-defined sum, which is positive infinity. 
By contrast, for the set { …–1/(2n),…, –1/6, –1/4, –1/2, 1, 1/3, 1/5, …, 1/(2n+1), …}, the sum of 
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the negatives is infinite, as is the sum of the positives, and hence this set has no well-defined 
sum. 
Consider now the Pasadena game, introduced by Nover and Hájek (2004)
1
: a fair coin is 
flipped until a heads comes up, and one wins something if the number of flips is odd and loses 
something if the number of flips is even. More precisely, the payoffs, along with the associated 
probabilities are described as follows:  
 
Pasadena 
Positive payoffs: < 1/2, 2/1>, < 1/8, 8/3>, …, < 1/22n–1, 22n–1/(2n–1)>, ….  
Negative payoffs: < 1/4, –4/2>, < 1/16, –16/4>, …, < 1/22n, –22n/2n>, … 
 
The set of probability-weighted payoffs is thus {…–1/2n, ….–1/6, –1/4, –1/2, 1, 1/3, 1/5, … 
1/(2n–1) …}. Given that the sum of the negatives is infinite and the sum of the positives is 
infinite, this set has no well-defined sum. Nonetheless, it seems natural to add these terms in the 
order of how many flips it takes for a heads to occur and thereby realize the payoff: 1 –1/2 + 1/3 
–1/4, …+1/(2n–1) –1(1/2n) …. Added in this order, the sum is log(2), or approximately .69. The 
problem is that, where a set of values has no well-defined sum, adding the terms in a different 
order can give a different sum. For example, adding the very same terms above in the following 
order (1+1/3–½)+(1/5+1/7–¼ )+(1/9+1/11–1/6)+ … produces a total of 1.5 log(2), or 
approximately 1.04. The sum is not well-defined precisely because there is no order-independent 
fact about what the terms sum to. 
The general problem that we address is the evaluation of risky options for which there is 
no standard expected value, defined as follows: 
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Standard Expected Value (definition): The standard expected value of an option exists and has 
value v (which can be infinite) if and only if the sum of the (countable many) probability-
weighted payoffs is well defined and equals value v.  
 
Throughout, we allow that the value of an option can be infinite. Consider, for example, 
the well-known St. Petersburg game, where a fair coin is flipped until it lands on heads, and, if 
that takes n flips, the payoff is 2
n
. This determines the probability-payoff set {<1/2, 2>, <1/4.>, 
….< 1/2n, 2n>, …}. This has a standard expected value equal to positive infinity, since the sum 
of the probability-weighted positive payoffs is infinite, and there are no negative payoffs.  
It is important to remember that having an infinitely positive value only establishes that 
the option is more valuable than any option with a finite value. Two options with infinite positive 
value need not be equally valuable. For example, if the payoffs of the St. Petersburg game are 
increased by one unit, the result is an infinitely valuable option that is arguably more valuable 
than the original, and certainly not equally valuable with it. 
 Throughout, we shall assume the following relatively uncontroversial claim, given our 
assumption of risk-neutrality: 
 
Standard Expectations: The value of an option is its standard (finite or infinite) expected value, 
if it exists. 
 
 We shall now formulate and endorse some principles of evaluation when options have no 
standard expected value. More specifically, we shall combine and extend the weak expectations 
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principle advocated by Easwaran (2008) and the relative expectations principle advocated by 
Colyvan (2008). 
 
2. Weak and Strong Expectations 
Kenny Easwaran (2008) has tentatively suggested that the Pasadena game (above) has a value of 
log(2) on the following basis: (1) He distinguishes between weak expected value and strong 
expected value (defined below). (2) He establishes that the Pasadena game has a weak expected 
value of log(2). (3) He tentatively suggests that, in general, risky options can be assessed on the 
basis of their weak expected value.  
Consider an option, X, and let E(X) be its standard expected value. Easwaran appeals to 
two versions of the law of large numbers to define weak and strong expected value for an option.  
Let Ave(X,n) be the average value of X for n independent trials. The two laws are:  
 
Strong Law of Large Numbers: For any option, X for which E(X) exists, there is a probability 
of 1 that the limit, as n goes to infinity, of |Ave(X,n)–E(X)| is 0. 
 
Weak Law of Large Numbers: For any option, X for which E(X) exists, for any positive 
number, e, the limit, as n goes to infinity, of the probability that |Ave(X,n)–E(X)| < e is 1.  
 
Both laws concern the probability of the standard expected value and the sample average 
value being arbitrarily close to each other. The difference between the two laws concerns 
whether the limit, as the sample size goes to infinity, is internal to the probability assignment (the 
strong law) or external to it (the weak law). 
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These two laws define the weak and strong expected value as follows: 
 
Finite Strong Expected Value (definition): The strong expected value of an option, X, exists 
and has finite value v if and only if there exists a real number v such that, with probability 1 the 
limit, as n goes to infinity, of |Ave(X,n) – v| is  0. 
 
Finite Weak Expected Value (definition): The weak expected value of an option, X, exists and 
has finite value v if and only if there exists a real number v such that, for each positive number e, 
the limit, as n goes to infinity, of the probability that |Ave(X,n) – v| < e is 1. 
 
In each of these definitions, the stochastic behavior of the sample average, Ave(X,n), is 
used to define a value for X. The strong expected value of X is the value v for which there is a 
probability of 1 that, for large enough sample sizes, the average value Ave(X,n) will be 
arbitrarily close to v. The weak expected value, by contrast, is the value v for which, for large 
enough sample sizes, there is a probability arbitrarily close to 1 that the average value will be 
arbitrarily close to v. Whenever the strong expected value is defined, the weak expected value is 
also defined and has the same value. 
 It turns out that, in the finite case, strong expected value just is standard expected value 
(although we shall see that this is not so in the infinite case): 
  
Finite Strong Expected Value Lemma (based on Durrett 2005, Ch. 1, sec. 8): An option has a 
finite strong expected value of v if and only if it has a standard expected value of v. 
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Thus, the following is equivalent to the uncontroversial Finite Standard Expectations: 
 
Finite Strong Expectations: The value of an option is its strong expected value, if it exists and 
is finite. 
 
Because Pasadena has no finite standard expected value, it has no finite strong expected 
value. Although the existence of a finite strong expected value entails the existence of a finite 
weak expected value, the reverse entailment does not hold. Indeed, as Easwaran shows, drawing 
on Feller (1971) and Durrett (2005), Pasadena has a weak expected value of log(2), even though 
it has no finite strong expected value.  
More generally, necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of finite weak 
expected value is provided by the following lemma, where Xn is the same as X, except that all 
payoffs with absolute values above n are set equal to zero. For example, for Pasadena, X, X2 sets 
all absolute payoffs above 2 equal to 0 and thus its probability-payoff pairs are <1/2, 2>, <1/4, –
4/2>, and <1/2
n
, 0>, for n>2. The standard expected value of Xn, E(Xn), is always well defined, 
given that truncated payoffs are bounded. 
 
Finite Weak Expected Value Lemma (Feller 1971, chapter VII, Thm. 1 and Durrett 2005, 
Chapter 1, 5.5): Option X has a finite weak expected value, v, if and only if (1) X has thin tails, 
i.e., x multiplied by Pr(|X|>x) converges to zero as x goes to positive infinity, and (2) the limit of 
E(Xn), as n goes to positive infinity, is v. 
 
The first condition requires that the limit of x multiplied by Pr(|X|>x) go to zero, as x 
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goes to infinity, where Pr(|X| > x) is the probability that the absolute value of the payoff, X, is 
greater than x. For example, for Pasadena, Pr(|X| >2) = ¼ (since Pr(X=2)=1/2 and Pr(X=–4/2) = 
¼, and all other payoffs have an absolute value greater than 2), and 2 multiplied by [Pr(|X|>2)] is 
2x1/4, or  ½.  
To determine the weak expected value on the basis of this lemma, for each payoff level n, 
one truncates the option X at level n, determines the strong expected value of this truncated 
variable, and then takes the limit as n goes to infinity. Although the Pasadena game has no 
standard expected value, it has a weak expected value of log(2). To see this, note that the 
absolute payoffs of the Pasadena have the form 2
n
/n, and thus condition (1) is equivalent to the 
requirement that (2
n
/n)Pr(|X|>2
 n
 /n) converge to zero, as n goes to infinity. For Pasadena, 
Pr(|X|>2
n
/n) = 1/2
 n
, and thus (1) requires that (2
 n
/n)x(1/2
 n
), or 1/n, converge to zero as n goes to 
infinity. Hence, condition (1) of the Lemma is satisfied. To see that condition (2) also is met, 
note that E(Xn) = 1–1/2+1/3+…+ (–1) n /n.2 Thus, the limit of E(Xn) is log(2) as n goes to 
infinity. Hence, condition (2) of the definition is met, and Pasadena has a weak expected value 
equal to log(2). It’s worth noting that the lemma ensures that the weak expected value is based 
on the summation of probability-weighted payoffs in increasing order the absolute value of the 
payoff. This is in contrast to Nover and Hájek (2004), who suggest that no particular order of 
summation is privileged. 
If a risky option has a finite standard expected value, then it has a finite weak expected 
value, and both values coincide. This follows from the fact that the standard expected value is 
finite only if the sum of the probability-weighted payoffs is finite for the both the positive, and 
the negative, payoffs. That in turn implies that (1) X has thin tails and (2) the sum of the 
probability-weighted payoffs does not depend upon the order of summation (which ensures the 
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sum in increasing order of the absolute value of the payoffs gives the correct answer).Thus, the 
concept of weak expected value is a strengthening of standard expected value. 
Easwaran tentatively proposes that Finite Strong Expectations be strengthened to the 
following principle: 
 
Finite Weak Expectations: The value of an option is its weak expected value, if it exists and is 
finite. 
 
As Easwaran notes, a player who plays a game a very large number of times at a price 
that is slightly higher (respectively: lower) than the weak expectation has a very high probability 
of ending up behind (respectively: ahead). Indeed, by repeating the game enough times, that 
probability can be made as close to 100% as one likes.  
Although Finite Weak Expectations is not uncontroversial
3
, we find it compelling.
4
 In the 
remainder of the paper we shall strengthen it in various ways.
5
  
 
3. Infinite Expectations  
Consider the following option: 
 
Squared St. Petersburg–Pasadena 
Positive payoffs: < 1/2, 4>, <1/8, 2
6
>, <1/32, 2
10>,…, <1/22n–1, 24n–2>, ….  
Negative payoffs: <1/4, –2>, <1/16, –4>, <1/64, –64/6>, …, <1/22n, –22n/2n>, … 
 
Here, the positive payoffs are the squares of the St. Petersburg payoffs, and the negative payoffs 
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are the same as Pasadena. Both the positive and the negative parts have infinite totals. Hence, 
there is no standard expected value. Nevertheless, this option has infinite strong expected value, 
defined as follows: 
 
Infinite Strong Expected Value (definition): Option X has infinitely positive (respectively: 
negative) strong expected value if and only if, for each positive number, e, with probability 1, for 
all sufficiently large n, Ave(X,n) > e (resp. < –e). 
 
This is the same as the definition of finite strong expected value, except that it requires 
that Ave(X,n) become arbitrarily large in absolute value rather than arbitrarily close to some 
finite value. 
An application of the following lemma establishes that the above option has an infinite 
strong expected value, even though it has no standard expected value: 
 
Infinite Strong Expected Value Lemma (Derman and Robbins, 1955). An option, X, has a 
positively (respectively: negative) infinite strong expected value if: (1) for some a and b, 0 < a 
<b < 1, and some c, c > 0, for all sufficiently large x, [x
a
 multiplied by Pr(X+ > x)] > c (resp.: [x
a
 
multiplied by Pr(|X–| > x)] > c), and (2) E(|X–|b) (resp.: E(|X+|b) is finite. 
 
We state this lemma because it is useful for understanding when the strong expected 
value is infinite, but we won’t appeal to it below. In order to avoid the need to explain some 
technical complexities, we simply assert, without explanation, that the lemma entails that the 
above option has infinite strong expected value, even though it has no standard expected value. 
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 The crucial point here is that, although finite standard expected value and finite strong 
expected value always are the same, infinite strong expected value can exist when there is no 
standard expected value (but not vice-versa).  
 We believe that Standard Expectations can be strengthened to the following plausible 
principle: 
 
Strong Expectations: The value of an option is its strong (finite or infinite) expected value, if it 
exists. 
 
 Indeed, we believe that a further strengthening is plausible. Consider: 
 
Weakly Infinite Pasadena 
Positive payoffs: <1/2, (2/1)x1.01>, <1/8, (8/3)x1.01>, <1/32, (32/5)x1.01>,…,  
<1/2
2n–1
, (2
2n–1
)x1.01/(2n–1)>, ….  
Negative payoffs: <1/4, –4/2>, <1/16, –16/4>, <1/64, –64/6>, …, <1/22n, –22n/2n>, … 
 
This is the same as Pasadena, except that the positive payoffs are multiplied by 1.01.  
Corollary 1 of Erickson (1973) establishes that the above option has no strong expected 
value. Showing this, however, would be complex, and we omit that demonstration.
6
 
 Although Weakly Infinite Pasadena has no strong expected value, it has infinite weak 
expected value, defined as follows: 
 
Infinite Weak Expected Value (definition): Option X has infinite weak expected value if and 
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only if, for each positive number, e, and each positive number strictly between 0 and 1, d, for all 
sufficiently large n, the probability that Ave(X,n) > e (resp. < –e) > 1–d. 
 
This is the same as the definition of finite weak expected value, except that it requires 
that Ave(X,n) become arbitrarily large in absolute value rather than arbitrarily close to some 
finite value. It is like the definition of infinite strong expected value, except that it requires that, 
for all sufficiently large sample sizes, the probability of the average being greater than any given 
value converges to 1 rather than that there be probability 1 that, for all sufficiently large sample 
sizes, the average is greater than any given value. Whenever the strong expected value (finite or 
infinite) exists, the weak expected value exists and has the same value. Weak expected value 
(finite or infinite), however, can exist without strong expected value existing. 
To see that the above option has infinite weak expected value, we can appeal to the 
following lemma: 
 
Infinite Weak Expected Value Lemma 1 (Durrett 2005, Ch. 1, sec. 8): An option, X, has a 
positively (respectively: negative) infinite weak expected value if: (1) X has thin tails, i.e., x 
multiplied by Pr(|X|>x) converges to zero as x goes to positive infinity, and (2) the limit of E(Xn) 
is positively (resp: negatively) infinite. 
 
This lemma is similar to the corresponding one for finite weak expected value, except (1) it 
requires that the limit of E(Xn) be infinite, and (2) it supplies only a sufficient condition for weak 
expected value.    
The above option has thin tails and the limit of E(Xn) is infinite. Thus, it has infinite weak 
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expected value. 
It’s worth noting that this lemma can be supplemented with:  
 
Infinite Weak Expected Value Lemma 2 (Baum 1963, Theorem 2). An option, X, has a 
positively (respectively: negative) infinite weak expected value if: for some a, 0 < a < 1, (1) x
a
 
multiplied by Pr(X+ > x) [resp. x
a
 multiplied by Pr(|X–| > x)] goes to infinity, as x goes to 
infinity, and (2) E(|X–|a) (resp.: E(|X+|a) is finite. 
  
Compared with the first lemma, this strengthens the first condition by appealing to x
a
 rather than 
to x, and it replaces the requirement that the limit of E(Xn) be infinite with the requirement that 
E(|X–|a) be finite. We mention this lemma because it is useful for understanding when weak 
expected value can be infinite, but we won’t appeal to it below.  
 We believe that Strong Expectations can plausibly be strengthened to: 
 
Weak Expectations: The value of an option is its weak (finite or infinite) expected value, if it 
exists. 
 
 Of course, those who reject Finite Weak Expectations will also reject the infinite version, 
as will those who reject infinite value even for standard expected value. We believe, nonetheless, 
that Weak Expectations is plausible and shall assume it below. 
 Not all options, of course, have a (finite or infinite) weak expected value. The following 
is an example of one that does not. 
 
15 
Symmetric St. Petersburg (SP*) 
Positive payoffs: < 1/4, 4>, < 1/8, 8>, …, <1/2n+1, 2n+1>, ….  
Negative payoffs: < 1/4, –4>, < 1/8, –8>, …, <1/2n+1, –2n+1>, …. 
 
This is like the St. Petersburg, except that it has negative payoffs defined to be symmetric with 
the positive payoffs. 
 The Finite Weak Expected Value Lemma above establishes that this does not have finite 
weak expected value (because it does not have thin tails). Moreover, for each n, the states s2n–1 
and s2n have the very same probability but the opposite value (–2
n+1
 versus 2
n+1
). It follows that, 
for any positive n and k, the probability that Ave(SP*,2n) is larger than k is equal to the 
probability that Ave(SP*,2n) is smaller than –k. Hence, the option SP* does not have an 
infinitely positive, or infinitely negative, weak expected value.  
Weak Expectations makes cardinal assessments of options when both options have a 
weak expected value with at least one value being finite. We shall now introduce some further 
principles for assessing options where (1) both options have infinite value, or (2) at least one 
option has no weak expected value.  
 
4. Indeterminate Expectations 
The weak expected value of an option has finite value k just in case the probability that its 
average is arbitrarily close to k converges to one, as the sample size goes to infinity. We shall 
now generalize this notion to include interval assessments of weak expected value (e.g., a value 
of between 2 and 6 units). 
To see the need for strengthening the weak expectations principle, consider the following 
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option, O, which is the same as Pasadena except that, for n>1, the sign of the payoff for sn is (1) 
the same as the preceding payoff when this is compatible with En(O) being inclusively between 0 
and 1, and (2) the opposite sign when this the same sign not so compatible. Thus, for example: 
 
Oscillating Weak Expected Value 
Probability: 1/2 1/4 1/8 1/16
 
1/32 1/64 1/128 1/256 …  
State:  s1 s2 s3 s4 s5 s6 s7 s8 … 
O  2 –4/2 –8/3 16/4 32/5 64/6 128/7 –256/8 … 
  
Option O has no (finite or infinite) weak expected value. Although O has thin tails, the 
sequence of the truncated expected values, E(On), oscillates, as n goes to infinity, between 0 and 
1. (The specification of the signs of the payoff ensures exactly this.) Thus, Weak Expectations is 
silent. Nonetheless, it is plausible, we claim, that O has a value of at least 0 and at most 1. We 
shall suggest that it has an “interval value” of [0,1]. 
In order to introduce the concept of interval value, we need to first introduce the 
following two standard mathematical concepts. The greatest lower bound of a set of numbers is 
(a) the largest (finite) real number that is a lower bound for (i.e., smaller or equal to) all members 
of the set, if a lower bound exists, and (b) negative infinity, if there are no lower bounds. For 
example, 2 is the greatest lower bound for {2,3,4, ,, n,….}, and –∞ is the greatest lower bound 
for {…, –n, …–4, –3, –2}. The least upper bound of a set of numbers is (a) the smallest (finite) 
real number that is an upper bound for (i.e., greater or equal to) all members of the set, if there is 
an upper bound, and (b) positive infinity, if there are no upper bounds.  For example, –2 is the 
least upper bound for {…, –n, …–4, –3, –2}, and ∞ is the least upper bound for {2,3,4, ,, n,….}. 
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We can now define the weak expected interval value of an option: 
 
Weak Expected Interval Value (definition): The weak expected interval value of option X is 
the closed interval [x1,x2], where: (1) x1 is the greatest lower bound on the value of k for which 
lim pr(Ave(X,n) ≥ k) = 1, and (2) x2 is the smallest upper bound on the value of k for which lim 
pr(Ave(X,n) ≤ k) = 1. 
 
All options have a weak expected interval value. An option with finite weak expected 
value of k has an interval value of [k,k], and an option with infinite weak expected value has an 
interval value of [∞,∞]. An option with a completely indeterminate weak expected value (e.g., 
Symmetric St. Petersburg, from the previous section) has an interval value of [–∞,∞]. Option O, 
above, has an interval value of [0,1]. It is thus worth more than any negative value, and no more 
than 1 unit of value. 
This provides the basis for the evaluation of options on the basis of the following 
plausible principle: 
 
Ordinal Interval Weak Expectations: Option, X, with weak expected interval value [x1,x2], is 
at least as valuable as option, Y, with weak expected interval value [y1,y2], if x1 ≥ y2.
7
 
 
Here we stipulate, as is standard for the extended reals, that (1) for any finite number, n ∞ > n >  
–∞, and (2) neither ∞ ≥ ∞, nor –∞ ≥ –∞. 
Thus, if X’s greatest lower bound is at least as great as Y’s least upper bound, then X is at 
least as valuable as Y. For example, X with [3,4] is at least as valuable as Y with [2,3], but Y is 
18 
not at least as valuable as X (since it’s not the case that 2 ≥ 4). Of course, for some options, 
Ordinal Interval Weak Expectations is silent. For example, it makes no comparative assessment 
of W with [3,10] with Z with [4,6]. 
This principle can be plausibly strengthened to say how much more valuable one option is 
than another. Consider then the following principles where it is stipulated that (1) ∞+n =∞, for n 
finite or ∞, (2) –∞+n =–∞, for n finite or –∞, and (3) ∞+–∞ is not defined: 
 
Cardinal Interval Weak Expectations: For option, X, with weak expected interval value 
[x1,x2], and option, Y, with weak expected interval value [y1,y2], X is not less than (x1–y2) 
units, and not more than (x2–y1) units, more valuable than Y. 
 
For example, for X with weak expected interval value [4,5] and Y with weak expected interval 
value [2,3], X is not less than 1 unit more valuable than Y and not more than 3 units more 
valuable. Moreover, for Z with weak expected interval value of [2,6], X is at least –2 units more 
valuable (i.e., 2 units less valuable) than Z and not more than 3 units more valuable. That is, X is 
not determinately more valuable than Z, but there are limits on how much worse (–2) and how 
much better (3) it is. 
 It’s important to keep in mind here that Cardinal Interval Weak Expectation sets lower 
and upper bounds on the difference in value between two options, but it does not claim that these 
bounds are the greatest lower bounds or the least upper bounds. Thus, for example, the claim 
that X is at least –2 units more valuable and at most 3 units more valuable than Z is compatible 
with the claim that X is exactly 1 unit more valuable than Z (but not with the claim that it is 
exactly 4 units more valuable). Indeed, many of the relatively indeterminate assessment of 
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Cardinal Interval Weak Expectations will be strengthen to more precise assessment by the 
principles of the next section. 
With respect to options with a weak expected value, Cardinal Interval Weak Expectation 
has the same implications as Weak Expectations. An option has a weak expected value just in 
case its weak expected value interval has the form [k,k], for some k (finite or infinite). For any 
two such options, say with intervals [k,k] and [l,l] the first is k–l to k–l units at least as valuable 
as the second, which is to say k–l units more valuable, as required.  
Cardinal Interval Weak Expectations makes, however, many comparative judgments that 
Weak Expectations does not. For example, as noted above, it judges X, with weak expected 
interval value [4,5], to be at least 1 unit, and not more than 3 units, more valuable than Y, with 
weak expected interval value [2,3], even though neither option has a weak expected value. 
In the following sections, we examine some principles for addressing two kinds of cases 
for which Cardinal Interval Weak Expectations makes no non-empty comparative assessment. 
One kind of case is where the subtractions involved are not well defined. This occurs where the 
interval values are [x1,x2] and [y1,y2], where both x1 and y2, or both y1 and x2, are positively 
infinite, or both negatively infinite (e.g., [–1,∞] compared with [∞,∞], or [–∞,1] compared with 
[–∞,–∞]. The second kind of case is where the assessment is radically indeterminate in the sense 
that the assessment is that one option is at least –∞, and at most ∞, units more valuable than the 
other. This may be true, but it is completely uninformative. It occurs where (1) both options have 
∞ as their greatest interval value but not as their lowest interval value, or (2) both options have –
∞ as their lowest interval value but not as their highest interval value (e.g., [2,∞] compared with 
[1,∞]). As we shall see, some additional principles make comparative assessments possible in 
some of these cases.  
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5. An Interlude on State Spaces 
The weak, strong, and standard expected values of an option are determined by its payoff 
distribution, {<p1,v1>, <p2,v2>, …, <pk,vk>,…}, where pk is the probability of receiving a payoff 
of vk. Options, however, have more structure than this, and the principles that we introduce 
below (unlike those introduced above) depend on this structure. We shall now make that 
structure explicit. 
Options are defined over state spaces. A state space is a set of basic states, along with an 
associated probability function over certain specified subsets of those states (the events). 
Because we restrict our attention to countable state spaces (i.e., with countably-many basic 
states) and countably additive probability functions (i.e., the probability of a union of a countable 
number of basic states is the sum of their individual probabilities), a state space can be 
represented by a countable set of couples {<s1,p1>, <s2,p2>,…, <si,pi>, …}, where si is a basic 
state, pi is the positive probability with which si occurs, and the pi sum to one.
8
 
An option is a real-valued function that assigns to each basic state (of its associated state 
space) the value of the outcome of the option, under that state, expressed in units of the relevant 
value (here left open).
9
 An option can thus be represented by a countable set of triples 
{<s1,p1,v1>, <s2,p2,v2>, …, <si,pi,vi>, …}, with si and pi as above, and with vi the value (or 
payoff) of the outcome of the option under state si. 
 Above, in discussing weak and strong expected value, we simplified this by combining 
states with the same payoff (and adding together the associated probabilities). The remaining 
principles, however, require the fuller state-space specification. 
 We shall now address some additional principles for assessing options defined on the 
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same state space.  
 
6. Relative Expectations  
If two options each have weak expectations, with at least one of them finite in value, then Weak 
Expectations determines how much more valuable one is compared with the other. If the two 
options do not have any weak expectation but each has a weak expected interval value, then 
Cardinal Interval Weak Expectations will typically give an assessment of some lower and upper 
limits on how much more valuable one option is compared with the other (e.g., at least 2 and at 
most 4 units more valuable).  
As indicated above, however, there are two cases where this is not so. One is where both 
options have positively infinite, or both have negatively infinite, weak expected value. In this 
case, Cardinal Interval Weak Expectations is silent, for example, because comparing [∞, ∞] with 
[∞, ∞] involves ∞–∞ and that is undefined. The second kind of case is where both options have a 
weak expected interval values of the form [n,∞], or both have the form [–∞,n], where n can be 
finite or infinite and need not be the same for the two options. In this case, Cardinal Interval 
Weak Expectations is judges each option to be –∞ to ∞ units more valuable than the other, and 
that is true but uninformative. We shall now add a principle, appealing to the state space 
structure, that covers some (but not all) of these cases.  
 A very plausible principle, which we shall strengthen below, is: 
 
Strong Dominance: If, (1) X and Y are options defined on the same state space, (2) for each 
basic state, X has a payoff that is at least as great as that of Y, and (3) for some basic states, X 
has a greater payoff than Y, then X is more valuable than Y. 
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 Strong Dominance is highly plausible but very weak. Consider SP (St. Petersburg) and 
SP’: 
 
   Relative Expectations 
Probability: 1/2 1/4 1/8 1/16 1/32 … 1/2n … 
State:  s1 s2 s3 s4 s5  … sn  … 
SP  2 4 8 16 32 … 2n … 
SP’  1.8 5 9 17 33  … 2n+1 … 
SP’–SP –.2 1 1 1 1  … 1 
 
For each state other than s1, SP’ has payoff that is one unit greater than SP, but for s1 SP’ has a 
payoff that is .2 lower. Thus, there is no strong dominance here. Nonetheless, it is extremely 
plausible that SP’ is more valuable than SP.  
The following principle from Colyvan (2008) captures this assessment, where X–Y is an 
option that, for each state, has a payoff equal to the payoff of X less the payoff of Y: 
 
Relative Expectations (Sufficiency Version): If (1) X and Y are options defined on the same 
state space, and (2) X–Y has a standard expected value that is nonnegative, then X is at least as 
valuable as Y.
10
  
 
SP and SP’ each have infinite standard expected value. Nonetheless, the standard expectation of 
(SP’–SP) is positive (.4 = –.1 + .5 =1/2 x –.2 + ¼ x 1 + 1/8 x1 …). Thus, Relative Expectations 
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rightly says that SP’ is more valuable than SP. 
 Colyvan (2008) endorses a stronger version of this principle, which also holds that X is at 
least as valuable as Y only if the standard expected value of X–Y exists and is non-negative. We 
believe that this is too strong. We believe that the relative value of two options can be assessed in 
many cases where this condition fails. We show this below by showing that stronger versions of 
the principles are plausible. 
 First, it is plausible to endorse a cardinal version of the principle: 
 
Cardinal Relative Expectations: If (1) X and Y are options defined on the same state space, (2) 
the standard expected value of X–Y is n (which can be infinite), then X is n units more valuable 
than Y. 
 
This is just like the previous principle, except that it specifies how much more valuable on option 
is than the other. It says, for example that SP’ is .4 units more valuable than SP. 
 It may seem confused to hold that one infinitely valuable option is n units more valuable 
than another infinitely valuable option, but it is not. For finitely valuable options, X and Y, if X 
is n units more valuable than Y, then the value of X is n units higher than the value of Y. This 
relationship, however, does not hold for infinitely valuable options. To say that an option is 
infinitely valuable is not to assign it a specific value. It is merely to say that it is more valuable 
than any finitely valuable option. Infinitely valuable options need not be equally valuable (and 
usually are not). Often they are incomparable, but sometimes one is more valuable another (e.g., 
when one dominates the other). Moreover, it is sometimes possible to say how much more 
valuable one infinitely valuable option is compared with another. To say that X is n units more 
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valuable than Y is just to say that X is equally valuable with the option obtained by increasing, 
for each state, Y’s payoffs by n units. For example, above, SP’ is .4 units more valuable than SP, 
in the sense that it would be worth paying .4 units to exchange SP for SP’. There is no claim that 
adding .4 to infinity is somehow greater than infinity. Once that is understood, there is no 
incoherence.  
To see the need for the second strengthening, consider: 
 
Relative WEV  
Probability: 1/2 1/4 1/8 1/16 … 1/22n–1   1/22n … 
State:  s1 s2 s3 s4 …  s2n–1   s2n …  
SP  2 4 8 16 …  22n–1   22n … 
Q  2+2 4–4/2 8+8/3 16–16/4 … 22n–1+(22n–1)/(2n–1) 22n–(22n)/2n  … 
Q–SP  2 –4/2 8/3 –16/4 … (22n–1)/(2n–1)  –(22n)/2n …   
 
 In this example, for Q–SP (which is just Pasadena), the sum of the probability-weighted 
payoffs is infinite for both the positive payoffs and for the negative payoffs. Thus, Q–SP has no 
standard expected value, and Cardinal Relative Expectations is silent. Note, however, that Q–SP 
has a weak expected value of log(2). We believe that that is sufficient to evaluate Q as being 
log(2) units more valuable than SP.  
More generally, we believe that the following principle is plausible: 
 
Cardinal Relative WEV: If (1) X and Y are options defined on the same state space, and (2) the 
weak expected value of X–Y is n, then X is n units more valuable than Y. 
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This principle replaces the appeal to the standard expected value of X–Y with an appeal to the 
weak expected value of X–Y. It rightly assesses Q as log(2) units more valuable than SP. 
(Cardinal Relative WEV will often give more determinate assessments of the comparative value 
of two options than does Cardinal Interval Weak Expectations. This is not a conflict. It is simply 
a case of being more determinate.) 
 In the above example, the two options each have infinite weak expected value. A similar 
example could be given where neither option has a weak expected value but their difference does 
(e.g., the same difference as Q–SP above). 
To see the need for one final strengthening of the relative expectations principle, consider 
the following example:  
 
Oscillating Differences 
Probability: 1/2 1/4 1/8 1/16
 
1/32 1/64 1/128 1/256  … 1/2n …  
State:  s1 s2 s3 s4 s5  s6 s7  s8    … s
n
 … 
SP  2 4 8 16 32 64 128 256  … 2n … 
U  2+a1 4+a2 8+a3 16+a4 32+a5 64+a6 128+a7 256+a8  …2
n
+an  …  
U–SP  2 –22/2 –23/3 24/4 25/5 26/6 27/7 –28/8  … an … 
 
Here (1) SP is St. Petersburg, (2) U is defined to have the same payoffs as SP but 
increased by an for state sn, and (3) the ai are the same as the Pasadena payoffs for state si, except 
that, for n>1, the sign of the payoff for an is (1) the same as an-1, when this is compatible with 
E([U–SP]n) being inclusively between 0 and 1, and (2) the opposite sign when the same sign not 
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so compatible. This ensures that E([U–SP]n) oscillates between 0 and 1, as n goes to infinity. 
(The set up here is similar to that of Oscillating Weak Expected Value in the section on 
indeterminate value.) 
Here, SP and U each have infinite weak expected value, but SP–U has no weak expected 
value, given that E([U–SP]n) does not converge as n goes to infinity. Thus, Cardinal Relative 
WEV is silent. Nonetheless, it is plausible, we claim, that U is 0 to 1 units more valuable than 
SP. Indeed, note that, although U–SP has no weak expected value, it does have a weak expected 
interval value of [0, 1], where (as defined above) this means that 0 is the greatest lower bound on 
the value of k for which lim pr(Ave(X,n) ≥ k) = 1, and (2) 1 is the smallest upper bound on the 
value of k for which lim pr(Ave(X,n) ≤ k) = 1. 
Consider, then, the following principle, where to say that X is m to n units more valuable 
than Y is to say that (1) m is the greatest lower bound on the value by which the value of X 
exceeds that of Y, and (2) n is the least upper bound on the value by which the value of X 
exceeds that of Y: 
 
Cardinal Relative Interval WEV: If X and Y are options defined on the same state space, and 
X–Y has a weak expected interval value of [m, n], then X is m to n units more valuable than Y. 
 
 As indicated above, when m is negative, to say that X is m units more valuable than Y is 
to say that X is at least as valuable as the option obtained by decreasing payoffs by |m| units. 
Cardinal Relative Interval WEV is equivalent to Cardinal Relative WEV in the special 
case where X–Y has a weak expected interval value [k, k], for k finite or infinite. Moreover, 
Cardinal Relative Interval WEV is equivalent to Cardinal Interval WEV in the special case 
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where X and Y each have a weak expected interval values of [x1,x2] and [y1,y2], where: (1) all 
the subtractions are well defined: x1 and y2 are not both positive infinity and not both negative 
infinity, and likewise for y1 and x2, and (2) the resulting interval value is not [–∞,∞]: x2 and y2 
are not both positively infinite x1 and y1 are not both negatively infinite. 
Cardinal Relative Interval WEV determines when one option is m to n units more 
valuable than another. It does not, however, assess the non-relative value of any option. It does 
not entail that Pasadena, for example, has value log(2). It thus does not entail Weak Expectations 
(assigning each option its weak expected value, if it has one). If, however, we add the following 
uncontroversial principle, then Weak Expectations will follow: 
 
Zero Value for Zero Option: An option that has a payoff of zero for all basic states has 
value 0. 
 
Given this principle, Cardinal Relative Interval WEV entails Weak Expectations, since if 
X has a weak expected value of n, then X is n units more valuable than the zero option. Given 
that the latter has value 0, the former has value n, as required. 
Cardinal Relative Interval WEV provides a sufficient condition for one option being n 
units more valuable than another on the same state space. We shall now tentatively suggest that it 
also provides a necessary condition. 
 
7. No Ordinal Ranking without Cardinal Relative Interval WEV 
Consider: 
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Converse Cardinal Relative Interval WEV: If X and Y are options defined on the same state 
space, then X is m to n units more valuable than Y only if the weak expected interval value of 
X–Y is [m, n], that is, only if m is the greatest lower bound on the value of k for which the limit, 
as t goes to infinity, of pr(Ave(X–Y,t) ≥ k) = 1, and (2) n is the smallest upper bound on the 
value of k for which the limit, as t goes to infinity, of  pr(Ave(X–Y,t) ≤ k) = 1. 
  
 This is simply the converse of the previous principle. It is, of course, a controversial 
condition, and we won’t attempt to defend it here. The key claim, however, is that value 
assessment must be grounded in the behavior of the long run averages of the options. If the 
probability of the average for X–Y being at least k, or at most k, does not converge to 1, then, we 
claim, there is no basis for judging X to be at least k, or at most k, units more valuable than Y. 
Let us illustrate the force of Converse Cardinal Relative Interval WEV by applying it to 
Symmetric St. Petersburg and Inverse Symmetric St. Petersburg (which is the same, but with 
payoffs multiplied by -1): 
 
   Symmetric St. Petersburg 
Probability: 1/4 1/4 1/8 1/8 … 1/2n+1 1/2n+1 … 
State:  s1 s2 s3 s4 … s
2n–1
 s
2n
 … 
SP  4 –4 8 –8 … 2n+1 –2n+1 … 
–SP  –4 4 –8 8 … –2n+1 2n+1 … 
SP–(–SP) 8 –8 16 –16 … 2n+2 –2n+2 …  
 
SP and –SP each has no weak expectations. Each has interval value weak expectations of 
[–∞,∞]. Still, one might be inclined to hold that they are equally valuable given that they are 
basic-state isomorphic in the following sense. Two options are basic-state isomorphic just in 
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case (1) each of the basic states in the state space of the first option can be uniquely paired up 
with a basic state in the state space of the second option, (2) with all basic states in the second 
space being paired up with some basic state in the first space (i.e., there exists a 1-to-1 mapping 
from the set of basic states of the first option to the set of basic states of the second option), such 
that: (3) for each option, and each of its basic states, (a) the probability of the state is the same as 
its partner’s, and (b) the first option’s payoff under that state is the same as the second option’s 
payoff under the state’s partner. In the above example, SP and –SP are basic-state isomorphic. 
The only difference between the two is that SP has positive payoffs for the odd states and 
negative payoffs for the even states whereas the opposite is true for –SP. For example, the payoff 
for SP under s1 is the same as the payoff for –SP under s2, and s1 and s2 have the same 
probability, and so on.  
Given that SP and –SP are basic-state isomorphic, one might be inclined to hold that they 
are equally valuable on the basis of the following principle: 
 
Basic-State Isomorphism: If two options are defined on the same state-space and are basic-state 
isomorphic, then they are equally valuable. 
 
This, however, is incompatible with Converse Cardinal Relative Interval WEV. For in 
order for SP to be equally valuable with –SP, it requires that SP–(–SP) have weak expected 
interval value of [0,0], but in fact that value is [–∞,∞]. It thus requires the rejection of Basic State 
Isomorphism. 
Although we won’t argue it here, we believe that the restriction imposed by Converse 
Cardinal Relative Interval WEV is appropriate. SP and –SP are not equally valuable.11 Moreover, 
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although Basic State Isomorphism is a sound principle when restricted to options with finite weak 
expectations, it is not, we suggest, a sound principle for options that do not have such 
expectations. 
Here is a second example of the force of Converse Cardinal Relative Interval WEV. 
Consider two St. Petersburg-like options: 
 
   Relative Expectations 
Probability: 1/4 1/4 1/8 1/8 1/16 1/16 … 1/2n+1 1/2n+1 … 
State:  s1a s1b s2a s2b s3a  s3b  … sna snb … 
SP1  4 0 8 0 16 0 … 2n+1 0 … 
SP2  0 4 0 8 0 16 … 0 2n+1 … 
SP1–SP2 4 –4 8 –8 16 –16 … 2n+1 –2n+1 … 
 
SP1 and SP2 each have infinite standard expected value (and hence infinite weak expectations). 
This does not entail that they are equally valuable, of course. Still, they are exactly the same 
gambles except they have payoffs for different but equiprobable states. Given that they are basic- 
state isomorphic, one might be inclined to hold that they are equally valuable, but, again, 
Converse Cardinal Relative Interval WEV does not allow this. For their difference does not have 
any determinate interval wev. It is [–∞,∞]. 
 We believe that SP1 and SP2 are not equally valuable.
12
 Basic State Isomorphism is not, 
we suggest, a sound principle when applied to options that do not have finite weak expectations. 
 We should emphasize, however, that Converse Cardinal Relative Interval WEV entails 
that SP1 is not more valuable than SP2, and that SP2 is not more valuable than SP1. It just insists 
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that they are incomparable rather than equally valuable. A similar point applies to SP and –SP 
above. 
Cardinal Relative Interval WEV, and Zero Value for Zero Option, exhaust, we 
hypothesize, the sound ordinal and cardinal assessments that can be made for options.
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8. Conclusion 
We have limited our attention throughout to state spaces with countably-many basic states and 
countably additive probability functions (i.e., the probability of a union of a countable number of 
basic states is the sum of their individual probabilities). Things are significantly more complex in 
the uncountable case. 
We have developed, with motivation but not compelling argument, several principles for 
the evaluation of options that have no finite standard expected value. The case arises when the 
sum of the probability-weighted values of an option is either ill defined (because the sum 
depends on the order in which the terms are added together) or infinite. Standard decision theory 
is silent about the evaluation of such options. Our project has been to extend the domain of 
evaluation. 
First, we endorsed the proposal of Easwaran (2008) to evaluate options on the basis of 
their finite weak expected value, if they have one. We then extended that to include infinite weak 
expected value. 
Second, we extended the relevant notion of weak expected value to interval value, where 
this is defined as the closed interval [x1,x2] such that: (1) x1 is the greatest lower bound on the 
value of k for which lim pr(Ave(X,n) ≥ k) = 1, and (2) x2 is the smallest upper bound on the 
value of k for which lim pr(Ave(X,n) ≤ k) = 1. Many options have an interval value (e.g., [1,3]) 
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even though they have no weak expected value (e.g., [3,3]). An option with an interval value of 
[4,6] is more valuable than an option with interval value [1,3]. Indeed it is 1 to 5 units more 
valuable. 
Third, for options defined on the same state space, we endorsed the proposal of Colyvan 
(2008) to evaluate an option, X, as at least as valuable as an option Y, if the standard expected 
value of X–Y exists and is non-negative (where X–Y is defined over basic states) . We then 
extended that principle (1) to be a cardinal principle that states how many more units more 
valuable X is, (2) to base the evaluation on weak (rather than standard) expected value, and (3) to 
apply in certain cases where X–Y has no weak expected value but has an interval value. When 
complemented with the uncontroversial Zero Value for Zero Option, this entails the Cardinal 
Interval Weak Expectations (that options with interval weak expectations have that value). 
Finally, we tentatively suggested, via Converse Cardinal Relative Interval WEV, that the 
above principles exhaust the sound ordinal and cardinal assessments that can be made of options 
(absolutely or relative to others). 
Each of our principles is, of course, controversial. We hope that we have motivated them 
enough to be taken seriously.
14
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 See also, Hájek and Nover (2006), Hájek and Nover (2008), and Hájek (2009). 
2
 See, for example, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alternating_harmonic_series 
3
 For additional discussion of Easwaran’s approach, see Fine (2008), Sprenger and Heesen 
(2009), and Smith (forthcoming). 
4
 Actually, only one of us (Vallentyne) finds Finite Weak Expectations compelling. The other 
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(Lauwers) finds it compelling for one-stage lotteries but not for compound lotteries. We discuss 
the problems for multi-stage lotteries in Lauwers and Vallentyne (in progress, 2014).  
5
 Once the appeal to finite weak expectations is allowed, the Pizza vs. Chinese food problem, 
introduced by Smithson and Hájek and Smithson (2012) and discussed by Bartha (2014), 
disappears. In this problem, one has a choice between ordering Chinese food and ordering Pizza, 
but each also has some chance of a Pasadena lottery. Adding a chance of the Pasadena lottery, 
with its weak expected value of log(2), does not introduce any complications, once finite weak 
expectations are accepted. 
6
 Roughly: For an option for which E(|X|) is infinite, the strong expected value is positively 
(respectively: negatively) infinite if and only if a certain measure, J– (respectively: J+) is finite. 
Given that Pasadena does not have an infinite strong expected value, both of these measures are 
both infinite. Multiplying the positive payoffs by 1.01 leaves both measures infinite. Thus, 
Weakly Infinite Pasadena does not have infinite strong expected value either. 
7
 See Fishburn (1985) for more on interval orders. 
8
 We assume here that the probabilities of states are independent of the options chosen. 
9
 For simplicity, we take options to assign the value of their outcomes, rather the outcomes 
themselves. 
10
 For a closely related principle in value theory (without probabilities), see Lauwers and 
Vallentyne (2004). 
11
 For related discussion, see Alexander (2012). 
12
 We thus agree with Seidenfeld et al. (2009) that two options with the same probability 
distribution over payoffs need not be equally valuable. We show this in the text for two options 
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that are basic-state isomorphic. Seidenfeld et al. brilliantly show that an option (with infinite 
standard expected value) can strictly dominate a second option with the same probability 
distribution over payoffs (but is not basic-state isomorphic). 
13
 Thus, we believe that Peterson’s Petrogradskij and Leningradskij options are incomparable, 
even though the two have identical payoffs except that (1) the former has an additional payoff of 
the St. Petersburg lottery under the state with a with a 1/8 probability and (2) the latter has an 
additional payoff of the St. Petersburg lottery under the state with a with a 1/4 probability. The 
interval wev of [Petrogradskij–Leningradskij] is [–∞,∞], and thus they are, we claim, 
incomparable. 
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